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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Other Crimes Evidence to Show Knowledge, Intent, System, etc.
As might be expected, a number of cases decided during the past
term concerned the admissibility of evidence as to other offenses.
Division of the court in this area remains marked, but a majority
continued to adhere to State v. PrieurI and State v. Moore.2
A serious problem is the exact meaning to be ascribed to "knowl-
edge," "intent" and "system" as used in R.S. 15:445 and 446. A
number of cases decided during the past term deal with the matter.
Interpreting the "knowledge" exception, in several narcotics
cases, the court held prior narcotics offenses admissible to show the
accused's guilty knowledge.3
As to the "intent" exception, a sharply divided court in State v.
Harrison' held that evidence that defendant later attempted an
armed robbery of a store was inadmissible to prove that he intended
an armed robbery of the same store on an earlier occasion. The court
found that under the circumstances there was no doubt that the
persons who entered the store on the prior occasion had in fact in-
tended an armed robbery, for the evidence was that the perpetrators
brandished guns, one stating, "This is a holdup." Balancing proba-
tive value against risk of undue prejudice, a majority of the court held
the evidence inadmissible, three justices dissenting.'
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Senior law student, Louisiana State University.
1. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443 (1974); Comment, 33
LA. L. REV. 614 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 30 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as PUGH].
2. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 446 (1974). See State
v. Pearson, 296 So. 2d 316 (La. 1974); State v. Grant, 295 So. 2d 168 (La. 1974); State
v. Pettle, 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973).
3. State v. Medlock, 297 So. 2d 190 (La. 1974); State v. Lewis, 294 So. 2d 204 (La.
1974); State v. Kibby, 294 So. 2d 196 (La. 1974); State v. Brown, 288 So. 2d 339 (La.
1974).
4. 291 So. 2d 782 (La. 1974). See also State v. Cosie, 295 So. 2d 165 (La. 1974),
where a similarly divided court decided an analogous problem.
5. For cases holding that under circumstances presented, prior crimes evidence
was admissible to show intent, see State v. Ackal, 290 So. 2d 882 (La. 1974) (alleged
unauthorized use of collateral security); State v. Lewis, 288 So. 2d 348 (La. 1974)
(attempted burglary); State v. Pettle, 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973) (attempted murder).
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In State v. Grant,6 the court provides a very interesting discus-
sion of the meaning of the "system" exception, recognizing that de-
spite the narrow language of 15:446, "[olur jurisprudence is uniform
in holding that evidence of other armed robberies is admissible where
almost identical tactics are used to show the 'system' or modus
operandi employed by the defendant."7
The court in State v. Prieur acknowledged that, in addition to
the knowledge, intent, system exception to the other crimes exclu-
sionary rule recognized in R.S. 15:445 and 446, evidence of other
crimes could properly be admitted as part of the res gestae, or where
there had been a conviction of a crime and the conviction was used
to impeach the witness. It did not, however, spell out whether there
are yet other exceptions. A per curiam in State v. Cosie,' taken liter-
ally, indicates that there are no exceptions other than those listed in
R.S. 15:445 and 446, but this presumably must be read in light of the
Prieur enumeration. There is language in State v. Kib by, '0 an opinion
written by Justice Marcus, suggesting that evidence of other crimes
is also admissible to show that a witness present at the other crime
had an opportunity accurately to identify the defendant. These writ-
ers doubt, however, that a majority of the court would so hold unless
the offered crime fits within one of the more traditionally recognized
exceptions."
State v. Jefferson'2 was one of several cases" decided during the
past term discussing the admissibility of other crimes evidence where
the other crime was claimed to be "part of the res gestae." The
meaning of the term res gestae in this area is unclear. It seems clear,
however, that its meaning here is by no means necessarily the same
as that in the hearsay area. Therefore, cases holding out-of-court
declarations admissible under the so-called res gestae exception to
6. 295 So. 2d 168 (La. 1974).
7. Id. at 172. For several other cases decided during the past term holding that
under the circumstances evidence of other crimes was admissible under the system
exception to the other crimes exclusionary rules, see State v. Lawrence, 294 So. 2d 476
(La. 1974); State v. Roquemore, 292 So. 2d 204 (La. 1974); State v. Thomas, 290 So.
2d 690 (La. 1974).
8. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
9. 295 So. 2d 165 (La. 1974).
10. 294 So. 2d 196 (La. 1974).
11. See State v. Grant, 295 So. 2d 168 (La. 1974).
12. 284 So. 2d 882 (La. 1973).
13. State v. Witherspoon, 292 So. 2d 499 (La. 1974); State v. Matthews, 292 So.
2d 226 (La. 1974); State v. Leichman, 286 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973); State v. Jefferson,
284 So. 2d 882 (La. 1973); State v. Frazier, 283 So. 2d 261 (La. 1973). See also State
v. Jones, 283 So. 2d 476 (La. 1973); State v. Drumgo, 283 So. 2d 463 (La. 1973).
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the hearsay rule are not necessarily controlling here.'4 In light of the
purposes behind the Prieur guidelines, it is believed that for evi-
dence of the other crime to qualify as res gestae under Prieur, the
other crime must be so closely connected that the indictment or
information as to the instant crime is deemed to carry with it notice
as to the other crime as well. Although the court does not talk in
terms of this test, it appears to be requiring a very close relationship
indeed."5 For example, in Jefferson, the court, speaking through
Justice Tate, stated:
[T]he other crime's circumstance was an immediate concomi-
tant of the offense with which the defendant is charged and
formed, in conjunction with it, one continuous transaction. It is
thus admissible as constituting part of the res gestae. La. R.S.
15:447, 15:448; State v. Whitsell, 262 La. 165, 262 So.2d 509
(1972). Under the circumstances, its relevance outweighed its
prejudicial effect. State v. Moore, 278 So.2d 781 (La. Sup. Ct.
1973); State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La. Sup. Ct. 1973).6
Answering an important question not decided by the court in
State v. Prieur, the majority decision in State v. Ghoram7 emphati-
cally states that the Prieur guidelines apply to evidence of other
crimes admitted at every stage of the proceedings, including cross-
examination and rebuttal. If, however, something has developed dur-
ing the testimony of the defendant on direct or in the case in chief
that quite unexpectedly makes evidence the prosecution may possess
as to other crimes especially relevant, then under these narrow cir-
cumstances, an argument can be made that the failure to give the
Prieur advance notification should not necessarily bar the admissibil-
ity of the evidence.
Reference by Police Witness to Defendant's Other Crimes
Reference to other crimes of a criminally accused is so inherently
prejudicial that the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an
improper reference to such other crimes by the "judge, district attor-
ney, or other court official" entitles the defendant to an automatic
mistrial.'8 On the other hand, if reference to such a crime is made by
14. See Comment, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969), reprinted in PUGH at 494.
15. But see State v. Witherspoon, 292 So. 2d 499 (La. 1974), and Justice Barham's
vigorous dissent protesting the admission of the other crimes evidence under the res
gestae category. Id. at 504.
16. 284 So. 2d 882, 885 (La. 1973).
17. 290 So. 2d 850 (La. 1974).
18. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.
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someone else, the Code provides that the "Court may grant a mistrial
if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the
defendant a fair trial."'" What if the improper reference to the other
crime is contained in an unsolicited response by a police officer to a
district attorney's questions? In two cases decided during the past
term, State v. Smith0 and State v. Howard,' the court held that a
police officer is not a "court official" within the meaning of article
770, that in such cases defendant is not automatically entitled to a
mistrial, and that an admonition to disregard may suffice to protect
defendant's rights.
The yet later case of State v. Clark," dealing with a police offi-
cer's response to defense counsel's questions, seems to these writers
to reflect greater concern for protecting defendant's interests in this
area. Although affirming defendant's conviction, the court, speaking
through Justice Tate, stresses that in the Clark case the police offi-
cer was responding to persistent questions by defense counsel, rather
than questions by the district attorney, and that the reference by the
police officer was an "oblique" reference. More importantly, it is
believed, the court emphasized that the statement was not "deliber-
ately uttered by a police witness to prejudice the defendant."2 There
is a negative inference in the Clark case, therefore, that in the future
if a court finds that a police officer has purposely referred to defen-
dant's other crimes in order improperly to prejudice him, a mistrial
may be the only appropriate remedy. In light of Clark, police acade-
mies and district attorneys may find it advisable, it is submitted,
carefully to caution police officers against unsolicited reference to an
accused's other crimes. A strong argument can be made that, aside
from a matter of pure statutory interpretation, the prosecution ought
to be held responsible for a police witness's testimony in this connec-
tion, and to achieve this result a defendant's right to an automatic
mistrial may be the only answer. This type of thinking may well
underlie the language in State v. Clark.
Reference to Other Crimes in Opening Statement
Of considerable importance is State v. Roquemorel' wherein the
court, speaking through Justice Marcus, very properly upheld the
19. Id. art. 771 (emphasis added).
20. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
21. 283 So. 2d 197 (La. 1973).
22. 288 So. 2d 612 (La. 1974).
23. Id. at 614.
24. 292 So. 2d 204 (La. 1974).
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failure of the prosecution to mention the fact of another crime in its
opening statement, even though evidence as to such other crime was
later held admissible by the trial court under the knowledge, intent,
system exception to the other crimes exclusionary rule. The prose-
cution had been concerned that if it mentioned the other crime in its
opening statement, and evidence as to same was thereafter held inad-
missible, it would risk a reversal. The Louisiana supreme court signif-
icantly said that the prosecution "rightfully considered that, if the
court refused to allow its introduction, it might well create a basis for
a mistrial." 5 Defendant, in cases such as Roquemore, under the
guidelines of State v. Prieur,6 has advance notice of the prosecution's
intent to introduce such other crime and thus is not surprised by
same. In light of Roquemore, a prudent prosecutor in such cases
should generally avoid referring to defendant's other crimes in the
opening statement.
"Mug Shots" of Defendant
Whether or not evidence is admissible properly depends upon its
probative value counterbalanced against the risk of undue preju-
dice.27 Relying on this test and jurisprudence from other states, a
majority of the court in State v. Jones'8 found inadmissible "mug
shots" taken of the defendant the night he was arrested. The majority
found that the photographs in question had a marginal relevancy and
there was other evidence to establish the peripheral point. The court
emphasized that showing the defendant in jail clothes depicted him
in an unfavorable light and might create an improper prejudicial
effect. The case affords another illustration of the present court's
concern with protecting a defendant against the risk of undue preju-
dice.
Character of the Victim-Evidence of Hostile Demonstration or
Overt Act
Prior to 1952, R.S. 15:482 provided that "in the absence of proof
of hostile demonstration or of overt act on the part of the person slain
or injured, evidence of his dangerous character or of his threats
against accused is not admissible."29 In that year, the statute was
25. Id. at 208.
26. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
27. See State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443,
446 (1974).
28. 283 So. 2d 476 (La. 1973).
29. Emphasis added.
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amended to substitute the word "evidence" for "proof," thereby sub-
stantially reducing the requirement for the introduction of such evi-
dence.30 In State v. Foreman,3 the court made it clear that despite
the liberality of the 1952 relaxed prerequisite, the trial judge would
not be required to accept incredible testimony as supplying the re-
quired predicate of "evidence of hostile demonstration or of overt
act." 32
In State v. Mitchell,3 in determining the admissibility of evi-
dence of the character of the victim, the trial court apparently ap-
plied the pre-1952 "proof' requirement, and the Louisiana supreme
court, without discussing the impact of the 1952 amendment, appar-
ently approved the test applied by the trial court. Further, the court
held that although the trial court's factual determination in this re-
gard is subject to review, it should not be disturbed on appeal unless
"clearly erroneous." In so holding, it relied heavily upon pre-1952
cases without discussing the significance of the 1952 amendment.
Although the writers are in full accord that the trial court's fac-
tual determination in this area should be given great weight on ap-
peal,34 it is submitted that in the instant case the trial court appar-
ently was applying an erroneous factual test (the pre-1952 criterion
of proof of hostile demonstration or overt act, rather than the post-
1952 test of evidence of same), and hence that the appellate court's
reliance on the trial court determination seems to have been mis-
placed.
Character of Prosecutrix in Rape Case
State v. Jack,35 written by Chief Justice Sanders, provides a nice
collection of authorities relative to admissibility in Louisiana of evi-
dence as to the character of the victim of an alleged rape. Generally,
such evidence is inadmissible. If, however, the defendant claims that
the victim consented, then he may introduce evidence of the reputa-
tion of the victim as to unchastity, but not evidence of specific acts
of intercourse with other men. Although recognizing that the majority
of American jurisdictions exclude specific acts of unchastity, Dean
30. For discussion of the impact of the 1952 amendment, see The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term - Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220, 226
(1953), reprinted in PUGH at 28.
31. 256 La. 999, 240 So. 2d 736 (1970).
32. Id. at 1010, 240 So. 2d at 740. See also State v. Rowland, 246 La. 729, 167 So.
2d 346 (1964).
33. 290 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974).
34. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited WIGMORE].
35. 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973).
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Wigmore was critical in this view,3" and the writers agree with the
Wigmore position.
WITNESSES
Compulsory Process-Violation of Sequestration Order
State v. Barnard37 presents an interesting problem occasioned by
defense counsel's failure to inform, as provided by the trial court, an
absent anticipated defense witness of the court's sequestration order.
Because the anticipated witness had sat in on a pertinent portion of
testimony by another witness, the trial court had excluded the testi-
mony of defendant's proffered witness. Over a vigorous and persua-
sive dissent by Justice Barham, reviewing what he considers dis-
criminatory treatment of defense witnesses in this area, the court
upheld the trial judge's action."6 Aside from a matter of state law, the
decision presents interesting problems as to whether under the cir-
cumstances defendant was denied the constitutional right of compul-
sory process.
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
Motion to Strike- Witness's Gratuitous Remarks
In State v. Baker,39 the court restated what seems to these writers
a very questionable position,40 that a motion to strike is unavailable
in Louisiana criminal procedure. Although it is true that at least two
relatively recent Louisiana cases have taken this position,4 another
somewhat obliquely indicates the contrary.4"
A motion to strike is well recognized at common law43 and serves
36. See WIGMORE § 200.
37. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
38. The court went on to find that if the trial court action was error, it was
harmless error. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For other cases decided
during the past term dealing with non-compliance of a sequestration order (in both
instances by prosecution witnesses), see State v. Lewis, 288 So. 2d 324 (La. 1974); State
v. Browning, 290 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974).
39. 288 So. 2d 52 (La. 1973).
40. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term -
Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 406, 411 (1963), reprinted in PUGH at 645.
41. State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961); State v. Saia, 212 La. 868,
33 So. 2d 665 (1948).
42. State v. Norris, 242 La. 1070, 141 So. 2d 368 (1962).
43. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 52 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; WIGMORE §§ 18, 19.
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a very useful purpose. There is no Louisiana legislation expressly
authorizing or prohibiting it, but in light of article 3 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure," it would seem appropriate for Louis-
iana to adopt this salutary device. The alternative suggested by the
court, the admonition to disregard authorized by article 771 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is not an altogether satisfactory solu-
tion. Article 771 expressly authorizes it only where "the remark is
irrelevant or immaterial." Further, the motion to strike, rather than
an admonition to the jury to disregard, is the appropriate procedural
vehicle where one is concerned with a bench rather than a jury trial.
With deference, it is submitted that a cross-examiner should be enti-
tled to limit the witness to answering the question asked, with what-
ever reasonable explanatory matter is deemed appropriate to prevent
him from injecting gratuitous unresponsive remarks, even where such
remarks are relevant and material.'5
In the instant case defense counsel, by cross-examination of a
state's witness, was attempting to test the propriety of the witness's
pre-trial lineup identification of defendant Doane. The following col-
loquy occurred:
Q. And is it not a fact that out of the ten people that were in
the two lineups, only one man was asked to step forward?
A. That's correct.
Q. And repeat the words: Give me that purse?
A. That's correct. And the man that was asked to step forward
is that man right there, Mr. Doane, the man in the red shirt, and
that's the same man that killed Harry Bell; he shot him in the
side of the head. (Emphasis added.) 6
Defense counsel claimed that the italicized portion of the witness's
answer was unresponsive and moved to strike. The Louisiana su-
preme court upheld the trial court's overruling of the motion, stating
that it was correct for a number of reasons. In addition to holding that
the motion to strike is unknown to Louisiana law, that defendant's
appropriate procedural motion was to ask the court for an admonition
to disregard under the authority of Code of Criminal Procedure arti-
cle 771, and implying that neither should lie where the remark is
44. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3 provides: "Where no procedure is specifically pre-
scribed by this Code or by statute, the court may proceed in a manner consistent with
the spirit of the provisions of this Code and other applicable statutory and constitu-
tional provisions."
45. See Ladd, Common Mistakes in the Technique of Trial, 22 IOWA L. REv. 609,
624 (1937). But see WIGMORE § 785.
46. State v. Baker, 288 So. 2d 52, 57 (La. 1973).
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relevant and material, the court indicated that the italicized portion
was properly explanatory of the witness's answer. With deference, it
is submitted that the remark in question went far beyond merely
explaining the witness's answer, that it contained gratuitous unre-
sponsive remarks, and that defense counsel should have had the right
to restrict the witness to answering the question asked. To the extent
the witness's observations were relevant, material and unobjection-
able, they could properly have been brought out on direct or redirect
examination, but a witness under cross-examination, it is submitted,
should not, under the guise of "explaining his answer," in effect be
permitted to give unsolicited gratuitous testimony.
Leading Questions
State v. Fallon47 contains a splendid statement by Justice
Summers of the discretion of the trial court with respect to leading
questions, so salutary and clearly stated an approach that it bears
repetition here.
Notwithstanding the general rule against leading questions,
the matter is largely within the discretion of the trial court, which
may allow such questions to be put to a witness when it deems
such course necessary or advisable, or refuse to allow such ques-
tions where the circumstances do not seem to require such mode
of examination; and in the absence of palpable abuse of discre-
tion resulting in prejudice to the accused, reversible error cannot
be predicated upon a ruling of the trial court allowing leading
questions. 8
The court goes on to say that "to warrant consideration on review,
an objection to a leading question should point out contempora-
neously the harm and prejudice the accused will suffer by permitting
the question."4 Thus, normally to protect one's rights on appeal with
respect to leading questions, it would be well for an opponent to take
pains to (1) specify that the question objected to is leading, and (2)
spell out the harm and prejudice he fears. At times, however, the
context itself presumably would demonstrate the harm and preju-
dice, and a specific objection asserting the leading question issue
should suffice,5" especially in light of the more liberalized procedure
47. 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974).
48. Id. at 291.
49. Id.
50. See in this connection language in State v. Vassel, 285 So. 2d 221, 227 (La.
1973).
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for protecting one's rights on appeal reflected in recent legislation5
precluding the necessity of bills of exception.
Refreshing Recollection
In the important case of State v. Tharp,52 relying upon Professor
McCormick's treatise, 5 a divided court indicates the test to be ap-
plied before a witness on the stand should be permitted to refer to a
prior memorandum for the purpose of refreshing his memory:
First, the court is required to weigh the value of the memo-
randum for refreshing memory against the danger of undue and
false suggestion, and must deny the use of such an aid if the
danger of improper suggestion outweighs the possible value for
actually refreshing the witness's memory. Second, the adverse
party has a legal right to examine the memorandum before it is
used and to have the memorandum for his own use on cross-
examination.54
State v. Payton5 holds, however, that if the memorandum used
to refresh the witness's memory was used by him outside of court
prior to taking the stand, the right of inspection does not exist.
Justice Barham dissented on this point, and Justice Tate in a concur-
ring opinion indicates that he would prefer a contrary view.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY
Prior Inconsistent Statements-Right of Defense Counsel to Inspect
Prior Statements of State's Witness
Where an agent for the police testifying for the prosecution has
made prior written statements or reports to the police, to what extent
is defense counsel entitled to inspect and utilize such reports in its
cross-examination and possible impeachment of the witness? The
problem is a difficult and recurring one,5" and lies at the heart of the
51. La. Acts 1974, No. 207, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-45.
52. 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
53. See McCoRMICK § 9.
54. 284 So. 2d at 541-42. See also the discussion of State v. Tharp in the text at
note 57 infra.
55. 294 So. 2d 211 (La. 1974).
56. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term -
Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 392 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 691; The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Evidence, 18 LA. L. REV. 139, 143
(1957), reprinted in PUGH at 689; Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 350 (1958), reprinted in PUGH
at 686; Note 18 LA. L. REV. 345 (1958), reprinted in PUGH at 681.
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very significant and yet somewhat enigmatic State v. Tharp.57 In
Tharp, a narcotics officer testifying for the state apparently relied
heavily upon prior memoranda, which he had with him on the stand
and had referred to (presumably before taking the stand), either to
refresh his memory, or as past recollection recorded. The majority
apparently found that the memorandum in question was used as past
recollection recorded rather than present recollection revived. Using
broad language perhaps portending more development in the area, a
divided court held that under the circumstances presented, defense
counsel was entitled to inspect the prior memorandum. 8
In the later case of State v. Payton,5" the majority denied a defen-
dant a right to inspect a memorandum used by a state's witness
outside of court to refresh his memory. 0
Prior Inconsistent Statements-Necessity for Having Laid Founda-
tion at Preliminary Examination
R.S. 15:493 provides that before a witness is to be impeached as
to a prior inconsistent statement, a foundation must be laid:
He must first be asked whether he has made such statement, and
his attention must be called to the time, place and circumstan-
ces, and to the person to whom the alleged statement was made,
in order that the witness may have an opportunity of explaining
that which is prima facie contradictory.
State v. Reed"' concerns a fascinating and very troublesome problem
57. 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
58. The court stated: "We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow
defendant to examine the report. Defendant had the right to establish the nature of
the testimony given from a prior record to determine the accuracy and truthfulness of
that testimony, or of the record itself. The trial court is obligated to monitor and
control the testimony from a prior record. That court must determine if memory is
actually refreshed as required by R.S. 15:279, which is the overwhelming view of the
common law jurisdictions which we should follow in criminal prosecutions absent
contrary statutory provisions. Here no such determination was made. The court disal-
lowed the second safeguard when it refused to permit defendant to examine the report
or memorandum, and to cross-examine the witness for the purpose of determining the
credibility of the testimony or the record.
"Insofar as State v. Holloway ... State v. Nails ... and State v. Franklin...
are in conflict with this opinion they are overruled." 284 So. 2d at 542-43 (citations
omitted).
59. 294 So. 2d 211 (La. 1974).
60. For further discussion of the Payton case, see text at note 55 supra. For a very
important Fifth Circuit case dealing with right of inspection as a matter of federal
constitutional law, see Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. 290 So. 2d 835 (La. 1974).
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as to the necessity of such a foundation where the testimony to be
impeached, instead of having been given by a live witness testifying
at the instant trial, was given by a now-deceased witness who testi-
fied at a preliminary examination. Defendant in a rape case had
called an eye witness to testify at a preliminary examination and the
state had cross-examined. However, the state did not examine the
witness as to an earlier statement given by the witness to the police
the night of the alleged rape. A divided court held that because of the
absence of a foundation, the statement to the police was inadmissible
as impeaching evidence, taking the position that under R.S. 15:493,
(1) there are no exceptions to the requirement of a foundation, and
(2) under the circumstances of the case, admission of the statement
denied defendant his constitutional right of confrontation.
With deference, it seems to these writers that to take the position
that there are no exceptions to the foundation requirement is an
unduly strict interpretation of the statute. Taken literally, such a rule
would preclude the admission as impeaching evidence of a prior in-
consistent statement where there had been no opportunity to lay a
foundation, as, for example, statements inconsistent with evidence
coming in under one of the hearsay exceptions (such as dying declara-
tions), or inconsistent statements made subsequent to the prelimi-
nary examination. 2 One can also argue that no foundation should be
required for thus impeaching the testimony of a deceased witness
where the cross-examiner at the preliminary examination had no
knowledge of a prior inconsistent statement, nor could have been
expected with reasonable diligence to obtain such knowledge. In the
instant case, however, the statement had been given to the police
prior to the preliminary examination and hence the writers feel that
the prosecution was chargeable with informing itself of it.3 Whether
or not the court will adhere to the strong language contained in Reed
and exclude an inconsistent statement where there was no opportun-
ity to lay the foundation will be interesting to observe. In any event,
in order to protect one's self as to the admissibility of an impeaching
inconsistent statement of a witness testifying at a preliminary exami-
nation, a lawyer (both defense counsel and prosecutor) may find it
advisable to attempt to lay the foundation set forth in R.S. 15:493.
Otherwise, if the witness dies, the statement given at the preliminary
62. See MCCORMICK § 37.
63. The majority in Reed states that the state "was on notice" (290 So. 2d at 838)
that the witness had made such a prior statement, whereas one of the dissenting
justices stresses that the prosecution took the position that at the time of the prelimi-
nary examination it was unaware of the prior statement and therefore could not cross-
examine the witness as to the inconsistency. Id. at 840 (Summers, J., dissenting).
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examination may come in free and clear of the impeaching inconsis-
tent statement.
Reputation Testimony in Segment of Community
When, to discredit the credibility of a witness, his reputation is
placed under attack, the orthodox view is that only the witness's
reputation in the community at large may be inquired into, not his
reputation in a particular segment of the community or among a
particular group of people. This view is currently under severe at-
tack" in light of changed socio-economic conditions. The Louisiana
statutes speak in terms of attacking "general reputation for truth or
for moral character" 5 and preclude inquiry as to "particular acts,
vices or courses of conduct,"6 but do not explicitly state that the
reputation in question must be in the community at large rather than
a segment thereof. The problem arose in State v. Corbin7 and the
court followed the orthodox view.
Lie Detector Tests
In State v. Corbin,68 a narcotics case, defense counsel requested
that all witnesses be given a lie detector test, and the prosecution
agreed. The trial court, however, rejected the suggestion and was
upheld on appeal." In so holding, the Louisiana supreme court
stressed that there was no authority in Louisiana providing for such
tests, and that the witnesses themselves had not expressed a willing-
ness to take the tests. There is a negative implication in this language
64. Wigmore states: "But in the conditions of life today, especially in large cities,
a man may have one reputation in the suburb of his residence and another in the office
or the factory at his place of work .... There may be distinct circles of persons, each
circle having no relation to the other, and yet each having a reputation based on
constant and intimate personal observation of the man.
"There is every reason why the law should recognize this. Time has produced new
conditions for reputations. The traditional requirement about 'neighborhood' reputa-
tion was appropriate to the conditions of the time; but it should not be taken as
imposing arbitrary limitations not appropriate in other times. 'Alia tempora, alii
mores.' What the law, then as now, desired was a trustworthy reputation; if that is to
be found among a circle of persons other than the circle of dwellers about a sleeping-
place, it should be received." WIGMORE § 1616 at 488. See also McCORMICK § 44.
65. LA. R.S. 15:490 (1950).
66. LA. R.S. 15:491 (1950).
67. 285 So. 2d 234 (La. 1973).
68. Id.
69. Justice Tate, however, felt that it would have been advisable for the trial court
to exercise its discretion in favor of allowing the lie detector tests. Id. at 240 (concurring
opinion).
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that if the witnesses had agreed, a different result might well have
been reached. The court, however, then went on to express great
doubt as to the reliability of lie detector evidence, and concern about
the prejudicial effect upon the jury of admitting same, thereby cast-
ing doubt upon the suggested negative implication. It will be interest-
ing to see whether, on stipulation by defense counsel, district attor-
ney and witnesses, the results of lie detector tests will be held
properly admissible in Louisiana."
It is pertinent to contrast the Corbin case with a Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal decision in Frey v. Department of Police,7 where the
court upheld the dismissal of a police officer by the Superintendant
of Police for failure to take a lie detector test concerning an intra-
departmental investigation. The court apparently felt that lie detec-
tor tests are sufficiently reliable for a police department in an intra-
departmental investigation to require one of its police officers, under
certain circumstances, to submit to same or be discharged for non-
cooperation. The court recognized that because of constitutional con-
siderations, nothing the police officer said during such administrative
proceedings could be used in evidence against him.
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Cross-examination as to Prior Arrests
The right of a defendant to show that a prosecution witness is
biased, interested in the outcome, or corrupted,72 is a most important
right. As recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
the very significant case of Davis v. Alaska," the violation of this
right at times rises to federal constitutional dimensions, as a denial
of effective confrontation.
Some years ago, in State v. Lewis,74 the Louisiana supreme court
recognized that despite the prohibition in R.S. 15:495 against attack-
ing a witness's credibility by cross-examining him as to prior arrests,
defendant could properly cross-examine an alleged accomplice called
by the state as to a prior arrest resulting in pending possible prosecu-
tion. The relevance of such questioning was to show that the prosecu-
tion might well have certain power over the witness, and thus the
inquiry was proper cross-examination to show bias, interest, or
70. See MCCORMICK § 207; Note, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 254 (1972).
71. 288 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
72. LA. R.S. 15:492 (1950).
73. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
74. 236 La. 473, 108 So. 2d 93 (1959), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term - Evidence, 20 LA. L. REV. 335, 340 (1960),
reprinted in PUGH at 133; Comment, 19 LA. L. REV. 684, 691 (1959), reprinted in PUGH
at 53, 60.
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corruption. In the recent case of State v. Brown," a narcotics case,
defense counsel attempted to cross-examine an undercover agent as
to his prior arrests, for the purpose of showing the witness's bias,
interest or corruption. Defense counsel was apparently attempting to
show that the witness had been persuaded to serve as an undercover
agent because of what the state "had on him," and thus might falsify
his testimony because of this "leverage.""6 In what seems to these
writers a very undesirable holding, the Louisiana supreme court up-
held the trial court's refusal to permit the questioning, limiting the
earlier case of State v. Lewis to its facts, to cross-examination by the
defendant of his alleged accomplice called by the state. In so limiting
Lewis, the ruling may run afoul of federal constitutional principles
reflected in Davis v. Alaska."
EXPERT WITNESSES
Opinion as to Ultimate Issue
Although many older cases throughout the country took the posi-
tion that an expert witness may not give an opinion as to an ultimate
issue in the case, the modern trend appears clearly away from this
quite undesirable rule." In Gage v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.," Judge Culpepper, speaking for the majority of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal, provides a very helpful review of authorities, and
following the modern trend, very properly concludes that a medical
expert in a malpractice case should be permitted to give his opinion
as to an ultimate issue-whether the doctor in question "used the
degree of care and skill ordinarily employed under similar circum-
stances by members of his profession in good standing in the com-
munity."8 This approach should likewise apply in non-malpractice
questions. Of course, this would not necessarily mean that an expert
witness should be permitted to give his opinion as to a question of
law,8" or in areas where the opinion would be confusing or not helpful
to the trier of fact, or merely superfluous."
75. 288 So. 2d 339 (La. 1974).
76. See the court's discussion of bill of exceptions No. 12 at 288 So. 2d 346.
77. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
78. See Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966); McCoRMICK
§ 12; WIGMORE §§ 1917-29. Further, FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 704 provides: "Testi-
mony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
79. 282 So. 2d 147 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 152.
81. Matters of foreign law, of course, present a special problem. See MCCORMICK
82. See MCCORMICK § 12; WIGMORE § 1929.
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Expert's Reliance Upon Information Provided by Others
The traditional view is that where an expert witness does not
have personal knowledge of the facts, a hypothetical line of question-
ing of the expert is necessary, and the hypothetical question is per-
mitted only if there is, or will be, sufficient evidence in the record to
afford proper underpinning as to its factual basis. 3 In line with this
view, and because of the hearsay rule and the firsthand knowledge
rule, generally an expert witness, as the basis for the opinion testified
to, is not permitted to rely upon factual information furnished him
by third persons outside of court."
There has been much dissatisfaction among the authorities con-
cerning the traditional approach, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide a radical departure, stating:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence."
Two cases decided during the past term seem to accord much
more with the new federal approach than the traditional view. In
State v. Austin, 6 the court took the position that it was no bar to an
expert's testimony that he had based his opinion on information sup-
plied him by others. The record of the case was such that it was not
clear whether there was evidence adduced at the trial as to the factual
basis for the witness's conclusion. In another case bearing upon the
problem, State v. Fallon,7 the court held that a doctor testifying as
an expert witness may rely in part upon reports of other doctors and
nurses concerning the patient's conduct in the hospital. It is unclear
whether such reports and records were properly in evidence.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Attorney-Client Privilege - Comment Upon Assertion
The court in dictum in State v. Haynes8 used strong language
in disapproving the prosecutor's forcing the defense to assert an
83. See MCCORMICK § 14.
84. Id. § 15.
85. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703.
86. 282 So. 2d 711 (La. 1973).
87. 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974).
88. 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974).
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attorney-client privilege in open court before the jury, and "belit-
tling" defense counsel for claiming it. Citing and quoting from the
American Bar Association Standards," the court also indicated that
a prosecutor who is aware that a defendant will claim an attorney-
client privilege should not force its assertion in open court before the
jury."' The writers certainly agree with this view.
Attorney-Client Privilege - Non-Confidential Information
As to the attorney-client privilege in the criminal area, Louisiana
legislation goes much further than that of most states, providing that
it is not simply what an attorney learns in confidence from his client
that is privileged, but also "any information that he may have gotten
by reason of his being such legal adviser."'" This broad language, it
seems to these writers, was given a surprisingly narrow interpretation
in State v. Jones." A Legal Aid staff counsel, who was not the attor-
ney of record, but whose duty it was to represent the defendant at
the lineup only, was called to the stand by the prosecution. Over a
claimer of privilege, he was forced to answer questions put to him by
the prosecution as to how the lineup was conducted, questions de-
signed to show how zealously the rights of the defendant were pro-
tected. The majority of the court took the position that the testimony
was not privileged, for "[tihe facts to which . . . [the witness]
testified were obtained independently of any communication or rela-
tionship with the defendants."9 In contrast, Justice Barham in a
concurring opinion" argued persuasively that the facts to which the
witness testified were obtained in consequence of his being the defen-
dant's attorney at the lineup, and hence were privileged. With defer-
ence, the writers agree with Justice Barham. Apparently, Louisiana's
legislative purpose was to authorize a very wide attorney-client privi-
lege as to matters learned by an attorney as a result of his representa-
tion and investigation of his client's case. It presumably wanted to
encourage defense counsel to make all possible investigations, and
thus to relieve him of the fear that information turned up might
ultimately redound to the detriment of his client. Although the in-
stant case concerned the peculiar problems presented by lineup pro-
89. ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.7 (1971).
90. For an analogous problem see discussion of the husband-wife privilege, text
at notes 95-102 infra.
91. LA. R.S. 15:475 (1950).
92. 284 So. 2d 570 (La. 1973).
93. Id. at 571-72.
94. All members of the court agreed that under the circumstances the rights of
the defendant'was not prejudiced by the testimony in question.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cedures, it may have wider application; it seems contrary to the spirit
of the article for defense counsel in a criminal case to be called by
the state to testify for it, against his client, as to facts gleaned while
he was representing the client.
Husband- Wife Privilege - Claimer in Open Court
In 1953, the Louisiana supreme court in State v. McMullan5
upheld a trial court's forcing a witness spouse to assert her general
husband-wife privilege in open court before the jury. It seems to these
writers that the McMullan case is quite unsound.'" The Federal Rules
of Evidence take care to achieve a different result,' and the American
Bar Association in its Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the
Prosecution Function states that a prosecutor should not call a wit-
ness when he knows the witness will claim a valid privilege. The
Louisiana supreme court in State v. Haynes" by dictum seems clearly
to favor the latter view, thereby throwing the rule of State v.
McMullan into a well-merited jeopardy. In the same case, the court
reflected a similar approach to the assertion of an attorney-client
privilege and prosecutorial "belittling" of a claimer thereof."
However, in State v. Jacobs,'°0 another case decided during the
same term of court, the supreme court held that no error was commit-
ted where the prosecution attorney called defendant's wife to the
stand and asked her in open court in the presence of the jury,
"Rhonda, do you know that there is a law which says that a wife does
not have to testify against her husband?" In so holding, the court
stated:
The State could not compel Mrs. Jacobs to testify against
her husband. Therefore, the State quite properly attempted to
ascertain that Mrs. Jacobs was testifying voluntarily and was
knowingly waiving her privilege against testifying adversely to
her husband.'
In the opinion of these writers, it seems that the procedure employed
in the Jacobs case is undesirable. It has the practical effect of permit-
ting the prosecution to suggest, via this line of inquiry about a privi-
95. 223 La. 629, 66 So. 2d 574 (1953), discussed in Note, 14 LA. L. REV. 427 (1954),
reprinted in PUGH at 173.
96. But see Note, 14 LA. L. REV. 427 (1954), reprinted in PUGH at 173.
97. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 513.
98. 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974).
99. See discussion of attorney-client privilege, text at notes 88-90 supra.
100. 281 So. 2d 713 (La. 1973).
101. Id. at 716.
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lege which is designed for the protection of the martial relationship,
that defendant is so bad that even his wife would voluntarily testify
against him. A preferable procedure, it is believed, would be for the
district attorney, out of the presence of the jury, to ascertain whether
the witness spouse is willing voluntarily to testify against defendant
spouse. This approach, it is submitted, is much more in accord with
the attitude reflected in State v. Haynes.10
HEARSAY
Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay
The line between hearsay and non-hearsay is one often difficult
to draw, and the problem is an important recurring one. Frequently
an attorney seeking to admit a questionable out-of-court utterance
will argue that it is admissible non-hearsay, that it is offered not to
show the truth of the utterance but the mere fact that it was said.
Whether or not such an explanation should be accepted by the trial
court depends, of course, on the relevance of the fact of the statement
as opposed to its truth content.0 3 The importance of the distinction
was well recognized by Justice Summers in State v. Green.'"' Ex-
plaining why the proffered evidence was inadmissible under the "fact
of utterance" classification, he lucidly stated that in order to be ad-
missible as fact of utterance "the mere fact that the statement was
made (by the person not under oath) must itself be a relevant and
important fact. But, if the fact that the statement was made (by the
person not under oath) would be of no importance except for the truth
of the statement, it is not admissible.' 0 5
Hearsay Exceptions Recognized in Louisiana
R.S. 15:434 states that "[hlearsay evidence is inadmissible,
except as otherwise provided in this Code." The provision is very
deceptive, for Louisiana jurisprudence in both civil and criminal
cases has generally recognized the traditional hearsay exceptions,
many more than the few listed in Title 15 of the Revised Statutes or
its predecessor, the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. Surprisingly
102. 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974).
103. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term -
Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 384 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 428; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970.1971 Term - Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344,
352 (1972), reprinted in PUGH at 425; Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954), reprinted
in PUGH at 414.
104. 282 So. 2d 461 (La. 1973).
105. Id. at 464.
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enough, the problem created by R.S. 15:434 has apparently given
little difficulty; generally, appellate cases simply have not discussed
the matter.10°
The subject is very ably explored in an excellent opinion by
Justice Calogero in State v. Smith. ' After helpfully analyzing the
history of Louisiana evidence law, the court concludes that R.S.
15:434, taken in the context of the structure of the legislation and the
tradition of the law, does not bar Louisiana's recognition of the tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions. A contrary decision would have overturned
much jurisprudence and achieved a most unsatisfactory result.
Applicability of the Hearsay Rule to the Criminally Accused -
Chambers v. Mississippi
In the recent very important case of Chambers v. Mississippi,'8
the United States Supreme Court recognized that under certain cir-
cumstances the application of the traditional rules relative to hearsay
and impeachment of one's own witness may operate unconstitu-
tionally-as, for example, where to apply them would prevent a de-
fendant from making out his defense by adducing credible, probative
evidence. Reflecting a somewhat similar attitude, the Louisiana su-
preme court in dictum in State v. Drumgo'" took pains to state:
Perhaps in different circumstances (where fairness and rea-
son dictate) we would not find strict adherence to the hearsay
rule required. However, in the instant case we do not find that
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the hearsay testi-
mony sought by defense counsel."10
State v. Browning"' presented a case strikingly similar, albeit
considerably weaker from the standpoint of the defendant, to that
presented to the United States Supreme Court in Chambers v.
Mississippi."' In Browning, defendant, charged with arson, sought to
put the blame on a third person who apparently had confessed out
of court to burning an unidentified house. The Louisiana supreme
court upheld the trial court in refusing to call the third person as the
court's witness, in refusing to permit defendant to call him under
cross-examination, and finally in refusing to permit the defendent
106. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 449, 451 (1961), reprinted in PUGH at 476, 479.
107. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
108. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
109. 283 So. 2d 463 (La. 1973).
110. Id. at 469. See also State v. Rabbas, 278 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973).
111. 290 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974).
112. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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(who had thus been forced to call the witness as his own) to cross-
examine him and bring out the out-of-court confession. If the facts
had been such that the defendant had been able to lay a predicate
sufficiently linking a third person to the crime in question, Chambers
v. Mississippi might well have necessitated a relaxation of traditional
evidentiary rules.
Prior Identification
If the prosecution offers testimony by a witness that another
person, the victim of the alleged crime, picked defendant out of a
line-up, and such testimony is offered to identify the defendant as the
person who committed the crime, then it seems quite clear that the
testimony in question is hearsay."' Despite earlier language to the
contrary,III the principle was clearly recognized by the supreme court,
speaking through Justice Calogero, in State v. Smith."5
Is it also hearsay if a witness testifies to his own prior out-of-court
identification? It is submitted that it is, for the out-of-court identifi-
cation was not under oath and subject to cross-examination, and the
fact that the witness is now on the stand and subject to cross-
examination does not remove the hearsay character of the testi-
mony." This is the traditional orthodox view."7 Although there is a
discernible tendency to create some sort of hearsay exception for such
testimony (i.e., testimony by a witness as to his own out-of-court
identification),"' the matter is fraught with difficulty, and satisfac-
tory protective limits have not been generally formulated. It is sub-
113. MCCORMICK § 251; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-
1972 Term - Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 315 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 429.
114. See State v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term - Evidence, 33 LA.
L. REV. 306, 315 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 429.
115. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973). The court held, however, that under the circum-
stances of the case the defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the hearsay
testimony.
116. See Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954), reprinted in PUGH at 412. See also
State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in The Work of the Louis-
iana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term - Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 312
(1973), reprinted in PUGH at 104; State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300 (La. 1974); State
v. McMellon, 295 So. 2d 782 (La. 1974). But see State v. Vassel, 285 So. 2d 221 (La.
1973), where the court takes the position (erroneously, it is believed), that a witness's
testimony to his own out-of-court statement is not violative of the hearsay rule.
117. McCoRMICK § 251.
118. See id.; Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due
Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials,
6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974).
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mitted that Louisiana should walk with caution in this difficult area.
Often, throughout the country, as recognized in the McCormick
treatise,"9 the hearsay character of the problem is not discussed, and
this is true of several cases decided in Louisiana during the past term,
where presumably defense counsel's objections did not raise the hear-
say issue. 20
Confessions - Corpus Delicti Showing as Prerequisite to
Admissibility
In 1959, the supreme court in dictum in State v. Brown'2' stated:
We think it is better and much fairer to follow the general
rule in this state and to require the establishment of the corpus
delicti before the confessions of accused are admitted in
evidence. 2
There are multiple problems re a corpus delicti predicate require-
ment, and without attempting to analyze them here, it should be
noted that last term the court in State v. Sellers,'3 in affirming the
conviction in an aggravated rape case, discussed and applied the
questionable Brown corpus delicti dictum.'2'
Confessions Containing References to Other Crimes
R.S. 15:450 provides:
Every confession, admission or declaration sought to be used
against any one must be used in its entirety, so that the person
to be affected thereby may have the benefit of any exculpation
or explanation that the whole statement may afford.
In excellent discussion by Justice Tate in State v. Haynes,'0 Justice
Calogero in State v. Fontenot, 2 and Justice Summers in State v.
119. MCCORMICK § 251.
120. State v. Asher, 294 So. 2d 223 (La. 1974); State v. Gilbert, 286 So. 2d 345
(La. 1973); State v. Jefferson, 284 So. 2d 577 (La. 1973); State v. Howard, 283 So. 2d
199 (La. 1973); State v. Franklin, 279 So. 2d 163 (La. 1973). See also State v. Jones,
284 So. 2d 570 (La. 1973).
121. 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959).
122. Id. at 573, 108 So. 2d at 236.
123. 292 So. 2d 222 (La. 1974).
124. For helpful discussions of the problem, see MCCORMICK § 158; WIGMORE §§
2070-75.
125. 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974).
126. 292 So. 2d 194 (La. 1974).
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Snedecor,2 7 the court makes clear that this is a protective statute
giving the defendant the option to have his statement used in its
entirety, and in no sense giving the state the right to import irrele-
vant, immaterial, prejudicial matter into a case (as for example,
reference to unrelated other crimes) simply because such improper
matter is included in an otherwise admissible statement. Although
none of these three cases cited or referred to the 1968 case of State v.
Cardinale, I8 which had taken a contrary position, it seems quite clear
that the unfortunate Cardinale view is no longer "the law."
Reported Testimony - Preliminary Examination
Article 295 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that testi-
mony of a non-defendant witness taken at a preliminary examination
is admissible at the trial "if the court finds that the witness is dead,
too ill to testify, absent from the state, or cannot be found." In State
v. Sam' a divided court, via a powerful and exhaustive opinion by
Justice Tate, reviewing federal constitutional requirements relative
to defendant's right of confrontation, held that for such testimony to
be admissible there must be a "showing that the witness has been
diligently sought without avail or that the prosecution has made a
good-faith effort to secure the witness's presence at the trial."'30 A
sheriff's return noting simply that the witness had moved to a place
unknown, and that the official filling out the return was "unable to
locate" him was found to be an insufficient showing.
On the other hand, in State v. Thomas,'3 where the prosecution
had taken great pains to demonstrate repeated unsuccessful efforts
to locate a state's witness who had testified at the preliminary exami-
nation, all members of the court upheld the admission of the prior
testimony at the trial.
Business Records - Criminal Cases
The nature, contours, and availability of the business records
exception in Louisiana is a matter of great difficulty in both civil"
127. 294 So. 2d 207 (La. 1974).
128. 251 La. 827, 206 So. 2d 510 (1968), writ granted, 393 U.S. 959 (1968), writ
dismissed, 394 U.S. 437 (1969), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1967-1968 Term - Evidence, 29 LA. L. REV. 310, 320 (1969), reprinted
in PUGH at 321.
129. 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973).
130. Id. at 85.
131. 290 So. 2d 690 (La. 1974).
132. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term -
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and criminal1 3 cases. The problem in criminal cases is heightened by
the federal 3 and state35 constitutional right of confrontation.
In State v. Lewis, 36 in order to identify weapons allegedly taken
by the defendant from a store, the prosecution offered records of an
inventory taken near the time of the burglary by employees acting
under the supervision of the store manager, who was a witness at the
trial and identified the records. The court held that under the circum-
stances the records were properly admissible as a business record.
The records apparently were utterly unsuspicious in character, and
presumably nothing would have been served by calling the employees
who actually looked at the weapons and their serial numbers, and
wrote same down. It appears that the witness on the stand was quite
capable of describing the method and manner in which the inventory
was taken. Surely under the circumstances the records should be
admissible. However, as noted above, there are great dangers and
difficulties in adopting any broad gauge business records exception
in criminal cases, and it is hoped that the instant case will not be so
interpreted.
Res Gestae - Excited Utterances
State v. Green, "I an aggravated rape case, concerned the admis-
sibility of testimony by a witness as to a statement made by another
person, an observer of an alleged sexual attack, after he (the observer)
had run two blocks from the place of the alleged attack to a friend's
home. The statement in question, it appears, was made within, at
most, five minutes of the alleged attack. Was such a statement ad-
missible as "part of the res gestae"? The court treated as untenable
the proposition that the statement could be considered part of the res
Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 387 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 489; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term - Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321,
325 (1970), reprinted in PUGH at 492; Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 449 (1961), reprinted
in PUGH at 476.
133. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term -
Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 318 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 489; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term - Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381,
388 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 490; Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 449, 451 (1961),
reprinted in PUGH at 476, 479.
134. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term -
Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 388 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 409; Comment, 30 LA.
L. REV. 651 (1970), reprinted in PUGH at 388.
135. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16, discussed in Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 51 (1974).
136. 288 So. 2d 348 (La. 1974).
137. 282 So. 2d 461 (La. 1973).
[Vol. 35
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 549
gestae, for it was unwilling to say that the declarations met the test
of R.S. 15:448, that they were "necessary incidents of the criminal
act, or immediate concomitants of it, or form[ed] in conjunction
with it one continuous transaction." The court held, however, that
because of other circumstances, the admission of the statement was
"harmless error." Although the court did not discuss the possibility,
it seems that the statements might well have properly qualified under
the excited utterance exception'38 to the hearsay rule.
A splendid discussion of the excited utterance exception and its
availability in Louisiana is afforded by Justice Calogero's lucid deci-
sion in State v. Smith.3 ' In it he amply demonstrates that despite
the restrictive language of R.S. 15:434, that "[h]earsay evidence is
inadmissible, except as otherwise provided in this Code," traditional
hearsay exceptions are also available in Louisiana. The facts of Smith
are fascinating. Following an armed robbery, the perpetrator locked
the victim in the freezer compartment of his dairy truck. Waiting
about thirty seconds, the victim knocked to be let out, and practically
immediately thereafter someone complied. An unidentified woman
handed the victim a slip of paper with a license number on it, and
utilizing the license number, the police shortly thereafter appre-
hended the defendant who, returned to the scene, was identified by
the victim. Was the slip of paper containing the license number ad-
missible? The court most persuasively held that it was, not as fact of
utterance as held by the trial court, but as either an excited utterance
or a present sense impression.
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING APPEAL
Necessity for Contemporaneous Objection or Motion for Mistrial
Generally speaking,'4 0 as recognized by the Louisiana supreme
court during the past term, in order for counsel to preserve his rights
on appeal, a contemporaneous objection or motion for mistrial is
required.'' Where counsel feels that either to make a contempora-
neous objection in the presence of the jury, or to request that the jury
be admonished to disregard certain testimony would unduly empha-
size the material objected to, then motion for mistrial-which pre-
138. Comment, 29 LA. L. REV. 661, 668 (1969), reprinted in PUGH at 494, 502.
139. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
140. See MCCORMICK § 52. A different rule is sometimes applicable where funda-
mental rights are involved, as for example, federal constitutional rights under certain
circumstances. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 705 (1966), reprinted in PUGH at 567.
141. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 770, 771, 775, 841. See State v. McCuridy, 286 So.
2d 638 (La. 1973).
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sumably can be made outside the presence of the jury-is the only
appropriate remedy. Accordingly, in State v. McCurady,4 2 the su-
preme court denied relief where defense counsel, in attempting to
explain his failure to make a contemporaneous objection in the trial
court, contended that he had been fearful of accentuating the objec-
tionable material in the minds of the jury. Apparently defense coun-
sel had neither made a motion for mistrial, nor perfected any bills of
exception. Under certain circumstances, as properly recognized in
State v. Stephenson,143 the prosecution's purposely forcing a defen-
dant to object and thus accentuate certain testimony may be grounds
for a mistrial."' The court found, however, that the alluded-to cir-
cumstances were not present in the instant case.
142. 286 So. 2d 638 (La. 1973).
143. 291 So. 2d 767 (La. 1974).
144. See also in this connection State v. Clark, 288 So. 2d 612 (La. 1974), where
the court emphasized that the objectionable remark by the police officer in question
had been made in response to persistent questions by defense counsel and not deliber-
ately made by the police officer to prejudice the defendant.
